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Debt Depreciation, Conglomeration, and Credit Constraints:
Evidence from Cattle Cycles
Abstract
A breeding cattle inventories example is used to study the effects of debt depreciation and firm
conglomeration on credit constraints.  Breeding cattle inventories is an interesting example to
study credit constraints because it is among the most cyclical of economic time-series and firms
have differential conglomeration levels.  The results are consistent with previous credit constraint
studies, i.e., breeding cattle inventories are sensitive to debt depreciation and firms with higher
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Salt Lake City, Utah, August 2-5, 19981Bierlen et al. (forthcoming) is the only previous study which has tested the credit constraint hypothesis
for beef cattle firms.  The results presented here, however, are generally not comparable to Bierlen et al.
(forthcoming) because of differences in models, data sets, and a cattle cycle versus a general agricultural boom-bust
orientation.
Debt Depreciation, Conglomeration, and Credit Constraints:
Evidence from Cattle Cycles
In the investment literature there has been a revived interest in the wedge between the
costs of  internal and external investment funds due to imperfections in capital markets--com-
monly referred to as credit constraints.  Empirical studies have taken two approaches to test the
credit constraint hypothesis.  The first approach, historical case studies, emphasizes the role of
debt deflation--the erosion of borrowers’ net worth relative to debt burdens during periods of
severe economic downturns which reduces real output by tightening credit to information-
intensive borrowers.   The second approach uses firm-level panel data to estimate standard
investment regression models (the most common being q theory) appended with a cash flow
variable.  Higher investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms with greater informational and
incentive problems are taken as evidence of credit constraints.  
Several studies--focusing on the 1921-1933 and the 1981-1986 periods--point to
agricultural credit availability as being particularly affected by debt deflation.  The current study
follows in the tradition of previous agricultural credit constraint studies in emphasizing episodes
of debt deflation, but focuses on beef breeding cattle, one of the most periodic of economic
cycles.
1  The focus is on breeding cattle inventories because it is at that level that the decision is
made to either breed or consume beef cattle--the decision which is thought to largely drive cattle
cycles.  Cattle prices and the value of breeding cattle inventories follow similar cycles which
generally lead inventory cycles.  These relationships are consistent with increasing net worth2
inducing inventory buildups and declining net worth inducing liquidations through the net
worth/credit availability mechanism.
A potential response of cattle breeding firms facing debt deflation induced credit con-
straints is to conglomerate.  Specifically, in many cattle firms, cattle is only one of several
enterprises--the others being crop and other livestock enterprises whose asset values are not
generally affected by shocks to breeding cattle asset values.  Another important method of
conglomeration for breeding cattle firms is for managers to pursue off-farm employment.  Due to
periodic debt depreciation and differential levels of conglomeration, the beef breeding cattle
example is able to combine the historical case study with the panel data approach. 
In spite of advances in modeling, recent breeding cattle inventory studies have ignored the
potential role of credit constraints in amplifying and propagating cattle cycles.  Recent studies
emphasize biological constraints and the decision to either breed or consume breeding cattle as
the driving forces behind cattle cycles.  These breeding/consumption decisions alter the age
distribution of breeding cattle inventories and, when combined with biological constraints, cause
cyclical “echo” responses as the age distribution converges to a stable equilibrium (Rosen et al.). 
That the credit availability of cattle breeding firms is tied to net worth is plausible for
several reasons.  Credit is virtually the only source of external investment funds.  Due to market
efficiencies, lenders can readily value land and breeding cattle inventories.  Because neighboring
firms can acquire and manage land and breeding inventories with low transaction costs and
breeding inventories can readily be sold to abattoirs or to the finishing industry, breeding cattle
assets are redeployable and thus have high liquidation values.  Because breeding cattle assets have3
high liquidation values, lenders can readily sell them at their value in best use with minimal
transaction costs.  This makes breeding cattle assets strong candidates for debt financing.   
Separate models are estimated with state-level panel data for beef cows and replacement
heifers--the two major components of beef breeding herds--in order to test the hypothesis that
breeding cattle firms adjust their inventories of beef cows, but not replacement heifers, in response
to shifting levels of credit availability.          
Breeding Cattle Inventory Models, Data, and Conglomeration Groupings
The following beef cattle and heifer replacement equations from Foster and Burt,
appended with a cash flow variable, are estimated to test the credit constraint hypotheses:
Beef cows:                 Ct = a0 + a1Ct-1 + a2Pt-2 + a3H1,t-1 + a4CFt + zt, (1)
Heifer replacements:  H1t = b0 + b1Pt-1 + b2H1t-1 + b3H1t-2  + b4(Ct-2 - b2Ct-3 - b3Ct-4) + b5CFt + ut, (2)
where the ak and bk are unknown parameters to be estimated, Ct is the number of  beef cows at
time t, H1t is the number of replacement heifers, Pt is the price of calves, CFt is cash flow, and zt
and ut are random disturbance terms.  We assume that replacement heifers are one year of age and
beef cows are two years of age and older. 
A complication in estimating equations (1) and (2) is that current cash flow is likely 
endogenous.  To handle the endogeneity problem here, models are estimated with two-stage least
squares in which binary variables are added to equations (1) and (2) to account for fixed state
effects.  Fixed time effect dummy variables are not included because they are highly collinear with
the price of calves--which should account for the primary time shocks to beef cow and replace-
ment heifer inventories.  4
In keeping with the goal of being able to reach conclusions at the aggregate level, while
exploiting the advantages of panel data, the econometric models are estimated with 1966 through
1995 annual data for the 32 states (see the Appendix for a list) with the largest breeding cattle
inventories.  Inventory numbers are taken from Agricultural Statistics (various years); calf prices
from Agricultural Prices: Annual Summary (various years); and cash flow from Economic
Indicators of the Farm Sector: State Financial Summary (various years) and unpublished data
from the USDA’s Economic Research Service.  State beef cow and replacement heifer inventories
are estimated at the beginning of each calendar year, calf prices are weighted annual state
averages, and cash flow is annual net cash income.  
In order to split the time-series element of the data into more and less credit constrained
years, we utilize the net worth-credit constraint relation, i.e.,  a negative shock to cattle prices
reduces net worth and increases credit constraints.  A positive price shock has the opposite effect. 
Since net worth, and thus credit constraints, are driven by calf prices,  investment-cash flow
sensitivities will be higher in periods of falling than rising calf prices.  To test this hypothesis,
separate inventory equations are estimated for a 15 year period of falling calf prices and a 15 year
period of rising calf prices.  Years of falling calf prices include 1974 through 1977, 1980 through
1986, and 1992 through 1995.  Years of rising calf prices include 1966 through 1973, 1978 and
1979, and 1987 through 1991.   
To test the ability of breeding cattle firms to reduce credit constraint levels through
conglomeration, states are subsequently sorted into high and low conglomeration groupings for an
alternative set of estimated models.  The procedure for grouping the states into two equal
conglomeration groupings of 16 is described in the Appendix.5
Model Results
Two-stage least squares coefficient estimates for the full sample beef cow and replacement
heifer equations are reported in Table 1.  Hausman tests reject cash flow exogeneity in both the
1966-95 beef cow and replacement heifer equations--thus our choice of a two-stage least squares
is appropriate.  As expected, all the 1966-95 beef cow equation coefficient estimates in section A
of Table 1 are positive and all are statistically significant at the 1% level.  That the once-lagged
beef cow and replacement heifer inventory coefficient estimates of 0.769 and 0.505, respectively,
are similar in magnitude to Foster and Burt’s estimates of 0.801 and 0.409, is encouraging. 
Because of their use of U.S. aggregate data, Foster and Burt’s (1992) twice-lagged calf price
coefficient estimate of 215.5 is much larger than the estimate of 0.392 here.
The main focus of interest is the cash flow coefficient estimate.  With a coefficient
estimate of 0.223 and a t-ratio of 3.09, the cash flow coefficient is positive as expected and
significant at the 1% level.  This agrees with the hypothesis that beef cow inventory levels are
sensitive to movements in cash flow and that breeding cattle firms are credit constrained.
Consistent with the 1966-95 coefficient estimates,  the non-cash flow coefficient estimates
in the falling and rising net worth equations in section A are positive and significant at the 1%
level.  Smaller lagged beef cow and larger lagged replacement heifer coefficient estimates in the
falling than in the rising net worth equation are consistent with the notion that during periods of
falling prices and tighter credit, breeding cattle firms cull beef cows at a higher rate--therefore
making replacement heifers a relatively more important component of the breeding herd and
having the effect of decreasing the mean herd age.  This positions breeding cattle firms  to
maximize calf output for the next price upswing.  Similarly, during periods of rising prices and6
looser credit, breeding cattle firms retain a higher number of beef cows--and non-producing
replacement heifers become less important--in order to maximize current calf production. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that credit availability decreases with falling net worth, the
falling net worth cash flow coefficient estimate is large and significant at the 1% level, while the
rising net worth coefficient estimate is small and insignificant.  The hypothesis that the two cash
flow coefficient estimates are equal is rejected at the 1% level on a one-sided test which is how
we test all differences in magnitude of cash flow coefficients. 
Unlike the beef cow inventory equations, only the once-lagged replacement heifer
inventory and once-lagged calf price coefficient estimates are consistently of the anticipated sign
(positive) and significant in the replacement heifer equations in Table 1, section B.  This is
contrary to Foster and Burt in which the twice-lagged beef cow and twice-lagged replacement
heifer inventory coefficients are also significant.  The 1966-95 once-lagged replacement heifer
inventory coefficient estimate of 0.743 is smaller than Foster and Burt’s estimate of 1.31. 
However, if like here, Foster and Burt’s coefficient estimate for the twice-lagged replacement
heifer inventory coefficient is zero (it in fact is -0.560), their coefficient estimate on once-lagged
heifer inventories would likely be about 0.75.  Consistent with the once-lagged beef cow
coefficient estimate in the beef cow inventory equations, the coefficient estimate on once-lagged
heifer inventories is larger in the period of rising than falling net worth, 0.856 versus 0.636.  
The 1966-95, and falling and rising net worth replacement heifer cash flow coefficient
estimates are all small (less than 0.07) and only the 1966-95 coefficient estimate is significant.
These and the beef cow results indicate that: 1) replacement heifer inventories may be affected by
credit constraints, but the replacement heifer inventories-credit constraint relation is not sensitive7
to shifting net worth, and 2) in response to shifting net worth, breeding cattle firms choose to
largely adjust their beef cow--and not their replacement heifer--inventories.
 We now estimate inventory equations to test the hypothesis that the inventory levels of
breeding cattle firms with higher conglomeration levels are less sensitive to credit constraints. 
Initially, we utilize the fact that beef calves are produced by both specialized and non-specialized
breeding cattle firms as defined in the Appendix.  We hypothesize that non-specialized cattle
breeding firms are less credit constrained than specialized cattle breeding firms because shocks to
cattle breeding assets affect net worth less.  The specialized group includes states primarily in the
Rockies, Northwest, and California, but also five southeastern states.  States in the non-special-
ized group include the Midwest and Plains states plus Washington and five southeastern states. 
The non-cash flow coefficient estimates in section A of Table 2 are all positive and 
significant at least at the 5% level.  The magnitudes of the once-lagged beef cow inventory and
once-lagged replacement heifer inventory coefficient estimates in the falling and rising net worth
equations have the relationships indicated in the full sample discussion.  
There is a substantial difference in investment-cash flow sensitivities between the
specialized and non-specialized groupings in section A.  The 1966-95 specialized cash flow
coefficient estimate is over four times the magnitude of the 1966-95 non-specialized cash flow
coefficient estimate, 0.545 versus 0.123, and is significantly different from zero at a higher level,
1% versus 10%.  That the specialized 1966-95 cash flow coefficient estimate is significantly larger
than the non-specialized 1966-95 cash flow coefficient estimate at the 1% level is consistent with
the hypothesis that firms with higher conglomeration levels are less credit constrained.  The falling
net worth cash flow coefficient estimate is significantly larger than the rising net worth cash flow8
coefficient estimate at the 1% level for both the specialized and non-specialized groupings.  This
result is consistent with the full sample models and is further support that credit constraint levels
are sensitive to shifting net worth under the asymmetry of information hypothesis.  That the
specialized cash flow coefficient estimate is significantly larger at the 5% level than the non-
specialized cash flow coefficient estimate in the falling, but not the rising net worth regime,
indicates that the effects of conglomeration in alleviating credit constraints is more important in
periods of falling than rising net worth.  
The non-cash flow coefficient estimates for the replacement heifer inventory equations in
section B of Table 2 are consistent with the full sample coefficient estimates.  All of the cash flow
coefficient estimates are relatively small and insignificant.  There are no significant differences
among the cash flow coefficient estimates.  These results are consistent with the notion that
breeding cattle firms largely adjust their beef cow--and not replacement heifer-- inventories in
response to shifting credit constraints.   
In results not presented here because of space limitations, we test the conglomeration
hypothesis with respect to differential levels of off-farm income.  We hypothesize that cattle
breeding firms with substantial off-farm income are less credit constrained due to conglomeration
effects--specifically that loans to breeding cattle firms with substantial off-farm income are
perceived as less risky because they are better able to meet loan payments regardless of shocks to
breeding cattle assets.  We determine whether breeding cattle firms have substantial off-farm
income based on whether the firm operator is full- or part-time on the farm.  The grouping with a
high percentage of part-time operators is denoted as “high off-farm income” and the other
grouping as “low off-farm income” as described in the Appendix. 9
In general, the off-farm income groupings for the cow inventory equation offer some
support for the ability of conglomeration to reduce credit constraints, but the results are not as
compelling as the firm specialization groupings.  There is no statistical difference among the cash
flow coefficient estimates of the heifer equations.  This further supports of the notion that
breeding cattle firms largely adjust their beef cow--and not replacement heifer-- inventories in
response to shifting credit constraints.   
Summary
We use a breeding cattle industry example to further explore investment-cash flow
sensitivities using combined historical case study and panel data approaches.  By appending a cash
flow variable to a reduced form investment model and testing the hypotheses that firms become
more credit constrained during periods of falling net worth, we find that firms with higher
conglomeration levels are less credit constrained, and breeding cattle firms adjust beef cow--and
not replacement heifer--inventories in response to shifting credit constraints.
Results are consistent with earlier studies.  Breeding cattle inventories are found to be
sensitive to movements in cash flow, particularly during periods of falling net worth, which is
consistent with debt deflation.  Similarly, the inventories of breeding cattle firms with higher
conglomeration levels are less affected by credit constraints, especially during periods of falling
net worth--consistent with the credit constraint under asymmetry of information hypothesis. 
Finally, equation estimates support the hypothesis that breeding cattle firms adjust beef cow--and
not replacement heifer--inventories in response to shifting credit constraints.  All of these findings
indicate that credit constraints play a role in amplifying and propagating cattle cycles.10
Table 1. Full Sample 2SLS Beef Cow and Replacement Heifer Inventory Equations
Cowst-1 Cowst-2 Heift-1 Heift-2 Pcalft-1 Pcalft-2 Casht N R
2






































































Notes: The dependent variable in section A is thousands of head of beef cows and in section B is thousands of head
of replacement heifers.  The absolute values of the asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.  The period of falling net
worth includes 1974-77, 1980-86, and 1992-1996.  The period of rising net worth includes 1966-73, 1978-79, and
1987-91.  Coefficients on state dummy variables are not reported.  All regressions use White’s consistent standard
errors.  See Table 1 for a list of the 32 states included in the regressions.11
Table 2. 2SLS Beef Cow and Replacement Heifer Inventory Equations by Firm Specialization
Cowst-1 Cowst-2 Heift-1 Heift-2 Pcalft-1 Pcalft-2 Casht N R
2












































































































































Notes: The dependent variable in section A is thousands of head of beef cows and in section B is thousands of head of
replacement heifers.  The absolute values of the asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.  The period of falling net worth
includes 1974-77, 1980-86, and 1992-1996.  The period of rising net worth includes 1966-73, 1978-79, and 1987-91. 
Coefficients on state dummy variables are not reported.  All regressions use White’s consistent standard errors.  See
the Appendix for states included in each grouping.12
Appendix
Table A. Conglomeration Grouping Criteria
Sample split Mean S.d.         High Low
% Specialized firms 75.7 7.3 88.7 65.6
% Non-specialized firms 43.1 14.3 62.1 16.5
% Low Off-Farm Income 42.0 8.1 55.7 31.4
% High Off-Farm Income 28.9 1.9 31.0 25.2
Source: calculated by authors from 1978 Census of Agriculture.
Notes: The procedure for grouping is to first order the 32 states by the 1978 means of the pertinent
conglomeration criteria and then split the ordered means at the fiftieth percentile  By this method, the
32 state sample is sorted into two equal conglomeration groupings of 16. Specialized firms are the
16 states with the highest percentages of specialized breeding cattle firms.  Non-specialized firms are
the 16 states with the lowest percentages of specialized  breeding cattle firms.  Specialized breeding
cattle firms are defined as those breeding cattle firms in which 50% or more of sales are from cattle
except feedlots (SIC number 0212).   Specialized firm states in descending order include Nevada,
New Mexico, Wyoming, Texas, Montana, Oklahoma, California, Oregon, Utah, Colorado, Louisi-
ana, Arkansas, Florida,  Mississippi, Idaho, and Virginia.  Non-specialized firm states in descending
order include Alabama, Washington, Tennessee, South Dakota, Missouri, North Dakota, Kansas,
North Carolina, Nebraska, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois. 
Low-off-farm income firms are the 16 states with the highest percentages of beef breeding managers
who worked zero days off the farm (SIC code 0212).  High-off-farm income firms are the 16 states
with the lowest percentages of beef breeding firms who worked zero days off the farm.  Low off-
farm income states are in descending order: South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Nebraska,
Wyoming, Nevada, Kansas, Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Virginia,
California, and Oklahoma.  High off-farm income states in descending order are: Arkansas, Utah,
Oregon, Minnesota, Illinois, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, Texas, Florida,
Mississippi, Ohio, Alabama, Indiana, Washington.13
References
Bierlen, Ralph, Peter J. Barry, Bruce L. Dixon, and Bruce L. Ahrendsen.  “Credit Constraints, Farm
Characteristics, and the Farm Economy: Differential Impacts on Feeder Cattle and Beef Cow
Inventories.”  The American Journal of Agricultural Economics. (forthcoming)
Foster, Kenneth A. and Oscar R. Burt. “A Dynamic Model of Investment in the U.S. Beef-Cattle
Industry.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 10(1992): 419-426.
Rosen, S., K.M. Murphy, and J. Scheinkman. “ Cattle Cycles.”  J. Pol. Econ. 102(1992):468-492.
United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics, Agricultural Statistics.
Washington DC, various years.
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Economic Indicators of the
Farm Sector: State Financial Summary. Washington DC, various years.
United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. Agricultural
Prices: Annual Summary. Washington DC, various years.